Thomas Cook Memo 150719
- Understand how the planned £750m recapitalisation and debt restructuring is likely to be implemented and the likely near-term and longer-term “recovery” rates for senior unsecured bonds
- Understand the key points of negotiation, in particular between Fosun and bondholders
- Understand the IRRs achievable for bondholders and existing shareholders by participating in a restructuring and recapitalisation respectively
- Understand the pro forma financial position of the carved out Tour Operator and remaining Airline / holdco
- Understand key elements of a turnaround plan for Thomas Cook’s Tour Operator
- Details of our restructuring model for Thomas Cook and resultant recovery rates / IRRs for senior unsecured bondholders
- What can senior unsecured bondholders expect to receive in an exchange of their bonds for post-reorganisation equity and new debt in the Tour Operator and post-reorganisation equity in the remaining Airline / holdco and what will this package be worth, both in the near-term and over time as a turnaround plan is implemented?
- How likely is it that a consensual recapitalisation and restructuring can be negotiated between Fosun, Thomas Cook, bondholders and banks?
- How can holdouts be disincentivised?
- Should bondholders try and gain a larger percentage of the post-reorganisation equity by themselves injecting new money into Thomas Cook (in place of, or alongside, Fosun)?
- What are the key points of negotiation, in particular between Fosun and bondholders?
- How would the pro forma financial position look of the carved out Tour Operator and of the remaining Airline / holdco?
- What IRRs are achievable on new investments in Thomas Cook – whether buying its bonds to restructure into equity; for existing shareholders potentially participating in the recapitalisation alongside Fosun; for Fosun?
- What are the key elements needed to turn the Tour Operator around and can they be achieved?