Why Read?

• Understand how loan putbacks to Together from its securitisation conduits would rise to c. £700m if house prices decline 20%+, causing a liquidity problem
• Understand how liquidity stress would be further exacerbated by cash trapping in Together’s securitisation conduits and lengthening behavioural maturities of securitised loans relative to the short-dated maturities of Together’s securitised notes
• Understand why bridge loans and specialist/complex buy-to-let (BTL), both a substantially increased proportion of Together’s loan book over the past 5 years, are high risk

What’s New?

• Deep dive on Together’s securitisation facilities and liquidity risks posed by these
• Analysis of risks in bridge lending with case studies on failed bridge lenders
• Analysis of risks in specialist/complex BTL lending and how bridge-to-let/term can be a way to hide “hung” bridges which cannot be repaid at maturity
• Competitive landscape analysis for each of Together’s lending niches
• Analysis of structural growth in UK specialist lending
• Analysis of how and why UK specialist mortgage lenders have failed previously (early 1990s and post 2007) and how the current boom in specialist lending compares to these Waves 1 and 2

Questions Answered

• Is Together’s loan to cost ratio closer to 100% on bridge loans?
• Is bridge-to-term a way to hide hung bridges in the BTL segment?
• Will Together really be profitable on a through-the-cycle basis given the increased prevalence of bridge loans and specialist/complex BTL in its loan mix?
• Every prior generation of specialist mortgage lender has failed at the first downturn in housing. Is this time different?
• How can Together reduce its liquidity risk?
• How does Together compare with other competing or comparable specialist lenders and banks?
• How should Together’s equity be valued and what is it worth?
• What recovery rate should we expect on Together’s Senior Secured Notes and on the Bracken Midco 1 Plc Senior PIK-Toggle Notes?